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A Simpler
Approach to
Financial Reform
Financial instability is a problem of monetary system design.

T

✒ By Morgan Ricks

here is a growing consensus that new financial reform legislation may be in order.
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, while wellintended, is now widely viewed to be at best
insufficient, and at worst a costly misfire.
Members of Congress are considering new
and different measures. Some have proposed substantially higher capital requirements for the largest
financial firms; others favor an updated version of the old GlassSteagall regime.
I suggest a simpler approach. It would be compatible with
other financial stability reforms, but is better understood as a
substitute for Dodd-Frank and other measures. The proposed
approach would require new legislation consisting of the following specific measures, starting from a pre-Dodd-Frank baseline:
Prohibit the use of short-term debt funding by all financial firms other than deposit banks. (The financial sector’s
short-term debt, inclusive of deposits, will be called “broad
money” herein; this is a conventional term for measures of
the money supply that include various kinds of non-deposit
short-term debt.)
■■ Apply reserve requirements (not to be confused with capital
requirements) to all of the broad money issued by deposit
banks, thereby giving the Federal Reserve the power to cap
the quantity of broad money outstanding.
■■ Fully insure (i.e., with no coverage caps) all of the broad
money issued by deposit banks and phase out insurance of
long-term certificates of deposits.
■■
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Charge risk-based fees to the deposit-banking sector for
this public backstop. These fees would continue even if the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s insurance fund is
fully funded, at which point the fees would become a fiscal
revenue item. (In the central banking context, this is called
“seigniorage”: fiscal revenue from money creation.)
■■ Tighten up existing deposit bank portfolio constraints.
Most importantly, implement a “swaps push-out rule” along
the lines of Dodd-Frank’s.
■■ Replace the Basel Committee’s new liquidity standards with
an international accord that prohibits financial institutions
from issuing broad money denominated in nondomestic
currencies. (In short, wind down the so-called “Eurocurrency” markets.)

■■

This simpler approach—which we can call the “licensed money”
approach—obviously centers around the financial sector’s shortterm debt (think maturities of under a year). The approach
confines the issuance of broad money to the existing deposit
banking system; it gives the Fed the power to cap the quantity of
broad money outstanding and to adjust the cap in the conduct
of monetary policy; it wraps broad money with a public backstop,
making it sovereign and default-free; and it charges the banking
system a fee for this public commitment.
The licensed money approach is designed to render the financial system panic-proof. The term “panic” is used here in a specific
sense: to quote Ben Bernanke, it is “a generalized run by providers of short-term funding to a set of financial institutions.” The
licensed money system is based on the idea that, when it comes
to financial stability policy, panics are “the problem” (or the main
one anyway). I’ll discuss this further, below.
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Notice what is not included in the licensed money approach.
There is nothing here about “systemic” or “macroprudential”
oversight of the financial system; no designations of nonbank
financial firms for special regulation; no new resolution authority
for nonbanks; nothing about the securitization markets; nothing about derivatives (apart from the push-out); no proprietary
trading limits; nothing about breaking up the banks; and no
Glass-Steagall-type limitations on affiliations between banks
and nonbanks. Again, the licensed money system would be compatible with those measures, but it should reduce the perceived
need for them.

The Regulatory Perimeter

The sketch above is silent about what activities can take place
outside the licensed banking sector. It only says that those activities must be financed in the capital markets (with equity and/or
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long-term debt), not the money market. In principle, the licensed
money system would allow for a very wide degree of latitude for
nonbank financial firms, subject to appropriate standards of
disclosure, antifraud, and consumer protection. So nonbanks
might be given free rein to engage in structured finance, derivatives, proprietary trading, and so forth. But they would not be
allowed to fund short.
It is sometimes suggested that securities dealers and other
nonbank financial firms “need” to fund short—that they somehow cannot conduct their businesses without short-term wholesale funding. This argument needs to be put to rest. There is
nothing about the broker-dealer business model that requires
unstable short-term funding. Dealers could conduct all their
current activities while financing themselves entirely with equity
and longer-term debt. Naturally, their cost of financing would
go up. Some of this cost would be passed through to their
customers, mostly in the form of higher bid-ask spreads. But
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bid-ask spreads today are subsidized; the dealer-funding model
has an implicit public backstop. All the more reason to prohibit
this funding model.
Once nonbank financial firms are financed in the capital
markets (with equity and longer-term debt) instead of the money
market, they are amenable to ordinary bankruptcy proceedings—
like any other firm. No special insolvency system for nonbanks is
required. In this regard, the recognition that “panics are the problem” is immensely clarifying. If panics really are the problem, then
financial institution failures do not imperil the broader economy
so long as they do not trigger a panic. And
the licensed money approach makes the
financial system virtually panic-proof.
Incidentally, the proposal would mean
the end of the money market mutual fund
sector as it exists today. The idea is to have
only one set of licensed issuers of broad
money, operating under the purview of
the money and banking authorities. The
licensed money system would get the
Securities and Exchange Commission
out of the monetary business, which falls
outside its mission and core competency.
It may be useful here to visualize, at a very high level, what
the licensed money approach would mean for a giant financial
conglomerate like J.P. Morgan, Bank of America, or Citigroup.
In simple terms, we can picture the conglomerate as consisting
of a holding company with two subsidiaries: a big deposit bank
and a big securities firm. Under the licensed money system, the
securities firm would be required to “term out”—that is, end its
reliance on short-term funding. Nor would the conglomerate be
able to simply move its securities business into its deposit bank:
deposit banks have long been expressly prohibited from engaging in securities dealing, subject to very narrow exceptions (see
12 U.S.C. § 24). Nor could the conglomerate use its deposit bank
to fund its securities business: the Federal Reserve Act already
imposes strict limitations on such affiliate transactions (see 12
U.S.C. §§ 371c–371c-1).
But, you might ask, aren’t regulators already taking steps to
panic-proof the financial system? I am referring here to the new
liquidity rules that U.S. regulators proposed in October 2013 for
the biggest financial firms—rules that are designed to implement
the global “Basel III” liquidity standards. Essentially, the new
rules, if and when implemented, will require the largest financial
firms to hold enough liquid securities to cover expected near-term
outflows in a liquidity squeeze. Isn’t this a reasonable approach
to panic-proofing?
The new rules are probably much better than nothing, but
there are reasons to question whether this is a good strategy. First,
the new rules are not generally applicable; they apply only to certain large financial firms. Short-term funding should therefore be
expected to migrate outside the purview of the new rules. Second,

the new rules are necessarily quite complicated. They require a
specification of what kinds of assets will remain liquid in a crisis,
as well as an estimation of firms’ expected cash inflows and outflows under a stress scenario. Needless to say, such estimates are
quite speculative. As Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo
emphasized in a recent speech, the new rules will not immunize
the financial system against damaging runs and panics.
Finally, and most importantly, the new liquidity rules are not
part of an integrated institutional design. In this regard, observe
that the licensed money system accomplishes several related

If panics really are the problem, then financial institution
failures do not imperil the broader economy so long as
they do not trigger a panic. And the licensed money
approach makes the system virtually panic-proof.

objectives: it makes the entire broad money supply sovereign
and default-free; it gives the Fed the power to cap the quantity
of broad money outstanding; it generates seigniorage revenues
from the entire banking system, not just the central bank; and it
re-establishes money creation as a matter of national sovereignty
(more on this in the next section). The new liquidity rules accomplish none of those things. They represent an ad hoc patch, not
a carefully thought-through design.

International Considerations

The licensed money system contains a crucial international component. Today, overseas financial entities issue huge amounts of
dollar-denominated short-term debt instruments (called “Eurodollars”). Those instruments are typically issued to U.S.-based
institutions, and the proceeds of issuance are typically invested
back into the U.S. credit markets. This is classic fractional-reserve
banking: it is money creation. It involves the issuance of broad
money denominated in dollars, but it takes place outside the
reach of U.S. monetary and banking authorities. During the
recent crisis, the panic in the Eurodollar market prompted a
massive policy response from the Federal Reserve, peaking at a
staggering $580 billion in U.S. dollar funding to foreign institutions via liquidity swaps with foreign central banks.
Traditionally, money creation has been viewed as a matter of
national sovereignty. We presumably have reason to care when
counterfeiters of U.S. dollars are operating overseas, and U.S.
authorities are vigilant about combating this activity. Conceptually speaking, the issuance of dollar-denominated broad monies
by overseas financial institutions isn’t all that different.
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The most straightforward way to deal with this would be
through an international accord—an addendum to the existing
Basel capital accord. Countries (or currency areas) would agree
to prohibit domestic financial institutions from issuing broad
money denominated in nondomestic currencies. Essentially, the
Eurocurrency markets would cease to exist. Money creation would
be recognized as a sovereign prerogative.
To be clear, none of this would preclude foreign financial
institutions from owning U.S. deposit banks. Foreign institutions
could therefore offer dollar-denominated broad money (including checkable deposits) to their customers abroad. But their U.S.
bank subsidiaries would obviously be subject to the full panoply
of regulatory standards that govern other U.S. banks. Hence, all
dollar-denominated money creation would fall within the purview
of U.S. banking and monetary authorities.

Why Panic-Proofing?

The licensed money system is based on the idea that financial
stability policy should concern itself with panic-proofing—and
perhaps not much else. This claim often meets with fierce
resistance, generally on two grounds. The first objection is
that the problem of financial instability is about much more
than panics. (Panics, to repeat, are widespread redemptions of
short-term debt, period.) Panic-proofing, it is said, would not
necessarily mitigate problems like “asset-price bubbles,” “overleverage,” “excessive risk-taking,” and so on. And those other
problems are taken to pose a serious danger to the broader
economy in and of themselves, irrespective of their propensity
to trigger panics.
The second objection complements the first. It holds that,
even if panics were indeed “the problem” (so to speak), panicproofing—eliminating or greatly limiting run-prone funding,
in one way or another—would not be desirable. There would be
costs to such an approach, and enforcement would be challenging. Besides, the argument goes, there are other ways to deal with
panics. For example, we might leave fragile short-term funding
untouched while seeking to forestall the types of events that
trigger panics (collapsed bubbles and so forth). Or we could
just deal with panics as they arise; that’s what the lender of last
resort is for, after all.
These are fair objections, and addressing them in detail would
require a much longer article. I offer only a summary response
here. Start with the first objection: the claim that things like “bubbles” and “overleverage” pose a danger to the broader economy
in and of themselves, regardless of whether they might trigger a
panic. Fair enough, but when it comes to institutional design, we
do have to prioritize. Few would deny that panics do serious damage to the broader economy; they arguably dwarf other financial
phenomena in their destructiveness. The case against bubbles is
somewhat less conclusive. As many others have pointed out, the
dot-com bust of the early 2000s destroyed more wealth than the
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recent housing bust, yet the dot-com episode was followed by only
a brief and mild recession.
Now, maybe what we really care about is debt-fueled bubbles—in
other words, cycles of debt and deleveraging. A prominent set
of theories takes this basic tack. These include Irving Fisher’s
“debt deflation” theory, Hyman Minsky’s “financial instability
hypothesis,” Richard Koo’s “balance-sheet recession” theory, Ben
Bernanke’s “financial accelerator” idea, and John Geanakoplos’s
“leverage cycle” theory. Generally speaking, the theories do not
ascribe any particular significance to short-term debt. They are
about deleveraging in a generic sense, not panics per se.
Even if we accept those theories, we then face some thorny
policy questions. The theories tend to stress not just financial sector leverage, but also (or even mostly) overall levels of household
and business debt. Such matters take us far beyond the traditional
perimeter of financial regulation. Furthermore, there is reason to
think that overleverage becomes a serious problem only when the
economy has been severely damaged by some kind of shock. If
this is right, and if panics are a principal source of major trauma,
then panic-proofing might render “overleverage” somewhat less
problematic. Finally, it is worth considering whether our modern
answer to panics—basically, an open-ended commitment of public
support to much of the financial sector—might not be a major
source of “debt-fueled bubbles” and “overleverage.” If so, then this
only strengthens the case for rethinking how we deal with panics.
In the end, there are no conclusive answers to these questions
and we are left with judgment calls. But there appears to be a
strong argument that panics should be viewed as the central
problem for financial stability policy. Incidentally, this discussion highlights the problem with lumping various phenomena
together into a complex “financial crisis” and then treating it as
the unit of analysis and the thing to be prevented. This methodological tendency—which is practically ubiquitous—has major
consequences for policy analysis. It inevitably draws attention
away from the panic and toward the purported “excesses” that
preceded it. As a result, panic-proofing rarely makes it onto the
policy radar.
This brings us to the second objection mentioned above: the
claim that even if panics are taken to be “the problem,” panicproofing is not a good answer. As noted above, other strategies are
available: we might tackle panics indirectly by seeking to prevent
the occurrence of triggering events (like collapsed bubbles), or we
might just deal with panics on the back end with public liquidity
support. These arguments raise basic questions about the optimal
locus of intervention. The notion that we should try to forestall
triggering events presupposes that we can successfully identify
them (avoiding both false negatives and false positives) and successfully defuse them at reasonable cost. This presumably means
fighting bubbles, which is sure to be difficult and controversial
in the moment. Relying on the lender of last resort to deal with
panics is problematic, too. The very existence of this commitment introduces potentially severe distortions into the financial
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system: it encourages the growth of individual financial firms and
the financial sector as a whole, and it perversely subsidizes the
financial sector through artificially low funding costs.
None of this is to say that panic-proofing would be costless
(more on those costs in a moment). The point is simply that
the alternatives have serious shortcomings, too, and a robust
approach to panic-proofing should be on the policy menu—as a
complement to or even a substitute for other financial stability
measures.

What about “Narrow” Banking?

The licensed money system achieves panic-proofing by making
the entire broad money supply sovereign and default-free. Public
backstops of this kind raise obvious moral hazard problems. Is
there a way to do panic-proofing without creating moral hazard?
One strategy would be to limit issuers of broad money to
holdings of super-safe assets like base money and/or short-term
Treasuries. This portfolio composition presumably would make
public backstops of broad money superfluous. There would be
no need for anything like deposit insurance.
Proposals of this kind have been around for many decades.
They go by names like “100 percent reserve
banking” and “narrow banking.” These
proposals have typically applied to deposits, but there is no reason why they could
not be applied to broad money. In fact,
University of Chicago economist John
Cochrane recently proposed just that. In
a June 24, 2013 Wall Street Journal op-ed
titled “Stopping Bank Crises Before They
Start,” he argues that “the financial system needs to be reformed so that it is not
prone to runs.” His solution: “Don’t let
financial institutions issue run-prone liabilities”—in other words,
panic-proofing. Under his design, any financial firm that issues
run-prone debt, whether or not styled as “deposits,” would have
to confine its portfolio exclusively to base money and short-term
Treasuries. The proposal is radical: it would do away with the
existing deposit-banking business model.
As a method of panic-proofing, Cochrane’s narrow banking
approach has considerable appeal. However, there are some apparent drawbacks. The fiscal and monetary implications would need
to be thought through carefully. Under his design, the (broad)
money supply would apparently be capped at the amount of
Treasury debt outstanding. A long-term balanced budget (as
farfetched as that might seem today) could present a serious
monetary problem; at some point, paying down the debt would
automatically reduce the broad money supply. This raises a complex set of questions about monetary policy independence, fiscal
management, tax smoothing, and the implications of sovereign
default. By contrast, under the licensed money system, fiscal

considerations do not impose limits on the quantity of broad
money outstanding, as licensed banks can expand their balance
sheets (i.e., issue money) by investing in high-quality private credit.
This is not to say that portfolio constraints are unwarranted.
On the contrary, the licensed money system would take the
existing system as a starting point. Today, U.S. deposit banks are
basically limited to holding diversified portfolios of relatively
high-quality credit instruments (loans and investment-grade
bonds). They may not own stocks or junk bonds, for example. In
recent decades, the major loophole has been in the derivatives area.
As noted above, the licensed money system would follow DoddFrank by putting in place a swaps push-out. This is not because
of any prejudice against derivatives. Rather, it simply reflects the
fact that derivatives generally do not advance the system’s objectives. It is important to keep in mind that the system is designed
to issue the broad money supply—and banks issue money when
they acquire credit assets (cash instruments), but generally not
when they write derivatives (synthetic instruments). An exception
to the push-out is in order for interest-rate hedging; the DoddFrank Act includes such an exception.
Of course, the licensed money approach raises challenges of
its own—moral hazard in particular. Needless to say, the record of

The lender-of-last-resort commitment encourages the
growth of financial firms and the financial sector as a
whole, and it perversely subsidizes the financial sector
through artificially low funding costs.

deposit insurance in the United States is not unblemished. The
savings and loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s led to a costly $124
billion taxpayer bailout. However, it is worth noting that in the
years preceding the S&L episode, U.S. bank and thrift regulation
was characterized by glaring design defects. Portfolio constraints
were relaxed in the early 1980s, allowing thrifts to extend into new
and riskier asset classes. A reasonably coherent capital regime
did not exist until 1988. Risk-based deposit insurance premiums
were not introduced until 1991. Finally, prior to 1991, regulators
were not legally required to shut down critically undercapitalized
banks and thrifts on a prompt basis, so problems were left to
fester for years.
In response to the S&L debacle, meaningful improvements
were made to the design of U.S. depository regulation. And it
is noteworthy that, despite the staggering magnitude of credit
impairments in the United States from 2008 to 2010, no taxpayer
bailout of the deposit insurance system was required—not even
close. Total bank failure costs to the FDIC’s deposit insurance
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fund as a result of the recent crisis are estimated to be around
$100 billion. Those losses are being fully recouped from the
deposit banking sector, whose reported equity capital currently
stands at $1.6 trillion. In short, the deposit insurance system has
done more or less what it was designed to do. This experience
suggests that a well-designed system of portfolio constraints,
capital requirements, risk-based fees, and supervision can have
some success in counteracting the effects of moral hazard.
The licensed money approach is incremental; it sees much in
the current institutional setup that is worth preserving. It would
modernize the current banking system rather than scrapping it, as
some narrow banking proponents would do. Still, the similarities
here are more important than the differences. Both Cochrane’s
narrow banking approach and the licensed money approach take
panic-proofing to be the central aim of financial stability policy.
Once there is agreement on objectives, then it comes down to a
question of comparative institutional design.

Financial Regulation as
Monetary System Design

The last year has seen two remarkable speeches by senior Federal
Reserve officials on the topic of short-term wholesale funding.
The first came in February 2013 from William Dudley, president
of the New York Fed. “How comfortable should we be,” Dudley
asked, “with a system in which critical financial activities continue to be financed with short-term wholesale funding without
the safeguards necessary to reduce the risk of runs and the fire
sales of assets that can threaten the stability of the entire financial system?” His answer: “I don’t think we should be comfortable” with such a system.
Yet, he noted, that is the system we have—even after the financial reforms of recent years. “[W]e have not come close to fixing
all the institutional flaws in our wholesale funding markets,”
Dudley remarked. He offered “two broad paths” for addressing
the problem:
The first option would be to take steps to curtail the extent of
short-term wholesale finance in the system. In principle, regulators across a broader set of institutions and markets could take
steps to directly limit the use of short-term wholesale funding
to finance longer-term assets…. In other words, regulators could
require that a greater proportion of market-based finance be
funded by longer-term debt….
The other path would be to expand the range of financial
intermediation activity that is directly backstopped by the
central bank’s lender of last resort function.

Three months after Dudley’s speech, Tarullo addressed the
same topic. “I strongly believe that we would do the American
public a fundamental disservice were we to declare victory [over
financial instability] without tackling the structural weaknesses
of short-term wholesale funding markets, both in general and as
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they affect the too-big-to-fail problem,” he said. “This is the major
problem that remains, and I would suggest that additional reform
measures be evaluated by reference to how effective they could be
in solving it.” He emphasized the need for policy measures that
apply “more or less comprehensively to all uses of short-term
wholesale funding, without regard to the form of the transactions
or whether the borrower was a prudentially regulated institution.”
It is a remarkable fact that today—more than five years after
the panics of 2008—so little progress has been made in the area
of short-term funding. How can this failure be explained? Surely
part of the answer involves the two objections to panic-proofing
that were discussed above: first, doubts as to whether panics
in and of themselves are the main policy problem; and second,
a vague sense that, even if panics are the main problem, they
should be addressed indirectly rather than directly. Whatever
the reason, fragile short-term funding has not been dealt with
in a meaningful way.
Arguably, we have been making financial stability policy much
more complicated than it needs to be. Panics are an age-old problem. They are not about cutting-edge developments in modern
finance. Short-term debt is primitive, not complex. The upshot
is that panic-proofing does not entail the extension of regulatory
oversight or control over the outer reaches of modern finance.
Nor does it entail taking aim at nebulous enemies like “systemic
risk” or “excessive risk-taking.” It is not clear that these are even
meaningful concepts—much less that they can provide a sound
basis for policy.
Legal limits on the issuance of “private money” are nothing
new. At the risk of stating the obvious: current law prohibits
the issuance of deposit instruments without a special license.
In a prior era, similar prohibitions applied to the issuance of
circulating bank notes. In other words, the law has long made
money creation a privileged activity. It is widely acknowledged
that the financial system’s short-term wholesale debt obligations are functional substitutes for deposits. Yet they have no
legal-institutional status as such. Hence the short-term wholesale
funding markets today represent a form of “free banking”: money
creation without a license and outside the purview of monetary
and banking authorities.
It is sometimes said that enforcing short-term debt limits
would be difficult. True, but difficult compared to what? Compared to anti-counterfeiting laws? Capital requirements? Securities regulation? Tax laws? All of those legal systems present
opportunities for avoidance and evasion. Yes, enforcement is
challenging—welcome to the law.
The licensed money system is not exactly a method of “financial regulation.” It is better understood as a modernization of the
monetary system. Implicit in the approach is a counterintuitive
idea: that financial instability is, at bottom, a problem of monetary
system design. In fact, it always has been. This recognition brings
a great deal of clarity to the task at hand, and it points toward a
far simpler approach to reform.

